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TWO PERSPECTIVES ON STRUCTURING DISCRETION: JUSTICES STEWART
AND WHITE ON THE DEATH PENALTY
LARRY I. PALMER*

INTRODUCTION

In Furman v. Georgia,' both Justices Stewart and
White joined the majority of the United States
Supreme Court in holding discretionary death penalty statutes unconstitutional. In their separate
concurring opinions, each Justice indicated that
some methods of imposing the death penalty might
be constitutional, even though discretionary imposition of the death penalty was not.2 After Furman, both Justices Stewart and White agreed that
statutes providing for the imposition of the death
penalty in accordance with certain "standards"
were constitutional. 3 They disagreed, however, over
whether "mandatory" death penalty statutes were
constitutional means of imposing death. Justice
Stewart joined the Court's majority in declaring
two slightly different mandatory death penalty
statutes unconstitutional. 4 But, Justice White dissented in each of these cases maintaining that
mandatory death penalty statutes are constitutional. 5 In essence, fundamental theoretical differences led each Justice to frame the issues differently
in death penalty cases and accounted for the diverse outcomes. These fundamental differences are
* Part of the research done in conjunction with this
article was supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are
those of the author and do not reflect the opinions or
conclusions of the Ford Foundation. Mr. Palmer is Professor of Law, Cornell University; A.B., 1966, Harvard
College; LL.B., 1969, Yale University.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2 Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 314 (White,
J., concurring).
3
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality
opinion by Justice Stewart); id. at 207 (White, J., concurring); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion by Justice Powell in which Justice Stewart

joined); id. at 260 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality

opinion by Justice Stevens in which Justice Stewart
joined); id. at 278 (White, J., concurring).
'See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
(plurality opinion by Justice Stewart); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion by Justice
Stevens in which Justice Stewart joined).
5 428 U.S. at 306 (White, J., dissenting); 428 U.S. at
363 (White, J., dissenting).

never fully articulated in the opinions, but nonetheless are of far ranging significance not only in
capital cases, but in the criminal law in general.
This article illustrates that Justice Stewart's
"punishment" theory relies heavily upon procedural devices to individualize the decision of imposing the death penalty. Under his theory, appellate courts must occupy a key policy-making role
for a statute to meet the minimal requirements of
the Constitution. Justice Stewart believes that under the Constitution, legislatures must pursue conflicting goals in drafting death penalty legislation.
A death penalty must further retribution and general deterrence on the one hand, rehabilitation and
reform on the other. For Stewart, the only solution
is to adopt procedures which leave to the courts the
responsibility of weighing these conflicting goals in
individual cases. Thus, Justice Stewart's analysis
relies upon his interpretation of the Due Process
Clause of the fourteenth amendment and on the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.
By contrast, Justice White's analysis focuses entirely on the eighth amendment. He is concerned
primarily with the necessity for clearly articulated
standards of culpability. For White, general deterrence is a sufficient goal for death penalty statutes
and the issue is whether the state has identified
who deserves to die with sufficient particularity to
further this goal. Under this theory of "responsibility," there is little need for special procedural
devices.
Both theories aim at the same substantive result-that only those who legitimately deserve to
die are sentenced to death. In this sense, both theories are concerned with "individualizing" death
penalty decisionmaking. But differences as to the
constitutional so/urce of this requirement and consequently as ,to the constitutionally manuated
method of acoieving this end, lead to contradictory
results as-in the mandatory death penalty cases.
Part I of' this article develops the two theories
through analysis of the Justices' positions in Furman
and its major progeny in 1976.6 Part II deals with
6

See notes 3-5 supra.
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post-1976 death penalty litigation. In only one
case have Stewart and White been in complete
agreement in their method of analysis. Rather than
undermining the thesis of this article, this single
point of convergence illustrates that concepts of
"punishment" and "responsibility" have points in
common in legal decisionmaking since the concepts
are, in law as well as in common parlance, interrelated!
Part III concludes the article by examining the
implications of the two constitutional theories for
future death penalty litigation and other sentencing issues. Even if the Court never actively enters
the current debate over the sentencing process, the
perspectives ofJustices Stewart and White on how
death should be imposed make a contribution to
debate about our current sentencing practices. This
article illustrates that the constitutional theories of
Justices Stewart and White are differing normative
perspectives on how the component parts of the
criminal process ought to operate as a "system." 9
7See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality
opinion by Justice White in which Justice Stewart
joined). Coker held the imposition of the death penalty
unconstitutional for rape of an adult woman. Id. at 592.
8 The terminology of legal philosphers, "punishment
and responsibility," is used to label the constitutional
models of both Justice White and Justice Stewart. By
using these labels, it is not meant to imply that their
models correspond precisely with notions of punishment
and responsibility used by a particular philosopher. See
generally H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPoNSIBILIrv
(1968). Punishment and responsibility are concepts whose
interrelationship deserves to be treated at length in books,
not footnotes. See E. PINCOFIs, THE RATIONALE OF LEGAL
PUNISHMENT (1966). See also J. FEINBERO, DOING & DEsERvING: ESSAYS INTHE THEORY OF RESPONSIBLITY (1970).
As labels, punishment and responsibility are descriptive
of the complex moral problems that the Justices are
trying to solve in the death penalty litigation. Further,
use of the terminology alerts us that the problems facing
legal decision makers in this area are replete with concepts that are changing over time. See Lasswell & Donnelly, The Continuing Debate over.Responsibility: An Introduction toIsolating the Condemnation Sanction, 68 YALE L. J. 869
(1959).
Since the two constructs are so often interwoven, it
appears more appropriate in actual legal decision-making
to focus on issues ofadjudication or criminal liability and
issues of disposition, to decide what to do with persons
legally subject to state control. See generally Palmer, A
Model of Criminal Disposition: An Alternative to Official Discretion in Sentencing, 62 GEo. L. J. 1 (1973).
9For a general discussion of the development of systematic views of the criminal process, see Goldstein,
Reflections On Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American
CriminalProcedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1014-15 (1974).
For a critique of the "systems view" of the criminal
process, see, THE RULE OF LAw: AN ALTERNATIVE TO
VIOLENCE;

A

REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON

I. FURMAN AND

THE

1976 DEATH

PENALTY

LITIGATION

In separate opinions, Justices Stewart and White
joined the per curiam opinion declaring the administration of the death penalty unconstitutional
in the three cases before the Court in Furman v.
Georgia.'0 In those cases, the death penalty had
been imposed for the crimes of rape and murder
under the then prevailing legislative schemes that
gave discretion to judges and juries to withhold or
impose the death penalty." Justice Stewart reasoned that the eighth and fourteenth amendments
invalidated the imposition of the death penalty
under "legal systems that permit this unique pen-12
alty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.'
Justice White, apparently relying solely upon the
eighth amendment, reasoned that under the legislative schemes at issue the death penalty made only
a marginal contribution to the deterrence of
crime.' 3 In his view, the legislative policy of allowing the jury to bring the "community judgment"
to bear on sentence, as well as on guilt or innocence,
had the practical effect of eliminating the rationale
of the death penalty since legislative policy was not
were withheld
frustrated even if the death penalty
4
for the most atrocious crimes.'
In their relatively short concurring opinions,
both Justices distinguished their positions from

those of the other three concurring Justices. In
separate opinions and for different reasons, Justices
Brennan and Marshall had found the infliction of
the death penalty unconstitutional under all circumstances.' 5 Justice Douglas had found the imposition of the death penalty unconstitutional because the record proved that the penalty had been
inflicted against racial and other minority groups

LAw: AN ALTERNATIVE TO VIOLENCE at 265-69 (1970).
Io408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Court considered two cases

from Georgia and one from Texas. In the Georgia cases,
one defendant had been convicted of murder and the
other of rape. They had both been sentenced to death. In
the Texas case, the defendant had been convicted of rape
and sentenced to death. Id.
"See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971);
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1189 (1961).
12408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
3
Id.at 312-13 (White, J.,concurring).
14 Id. at

313.

15Id. at 305 (Brennan,J., concurring); id.at 370 (Marshall, J., concurring). Both Justices have continued to
adhere to their views throughout the Court's death penalty litigation. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
at 231 (Mar230-31 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id.
shall, J., dissenting).
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in an impermissible manner.'6 Both Justices Stewart and White, however, indicated that the death
penalty could be imposed in some circumstances.
Although Justice Stewart made reference to justice White's opinion, 1 7 neither Justice analyzed
their differences in approach. As already stated,
Justice White relied solely upon the eighth amendment, 8 while Justice Stewart relied upon both the
eighth amendment and the fourteenth amendment's Due Process Clause.1 9 The Justices also
differed as to what goals legislatures might legitimately pursue in death penalty schemes. In White's
opinion, general deterrence could not only be a
legitimate goal in using the death penalty, but
2°
could be labeled a "moral" goal as well. On the
other hand, Justice Stewart indicated that a legislature may pursue both retribution and deterrence.
According to Stewart, the state's pursuit of these
goals had to be balanced against another important constitutional interest-the rehabilitation or
it was the court's duty
reform of the offender-and
21
to strike this balance.
A. Furman's Progeny
Five years after Furman, the Court decided five
death penalty cases in which the differences between Justices Stewart and White became even
more pronounced. Justice Stewart joined the threeman plurality in all five cases. He authored the
plurality opinion in Gregg v. Georgia,22 upholding a
death penalty statute with constitutionally adequate "standards." He joined the plurality opinions upholding other statutes with similar stan24
dards in Proffitt v. Florida2s and Jurek v. Texas.

Justice Stewart also authored the plurality opinion!
declaring North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute unconstitutional in Woodson v. North

Carolina.ss Finally, he joined the plurality's invalidation of Louisiana's mandatory death penalty
statute in Roberts v. Louisiana.s2
Justice White wrote dissenting opinions in both
Woodson and Roberts because he believed that a
mandatory death penalty statute could be constitutional if it contained appropriate standards to
',108 U.S. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).

Id. at
'8Id. at
" Id. at
•2Id. at
21 Id. at
17

309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
311 (White, J., concurring).
306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
312 (White, J., concurring).
307 (Stewart, J., concurring).

" 4 2 8 U.S.
U.S.
24428 U.S.
2 428 U.S.
26428 U.S.
23428

153
242
262
280
325

(1976).
(1976).
(1976).
(1976).
(1976).

JVol. 70

determine culpability.27 Although he joined the
plurality in Gregg, Proffitt and Jurek in upholding
those statutes, Justice White's concurring opinions
in all three of these cases expressed disagreement
'
with the reasoning of the plurality. 8 In White's
view, none of these newly enacted statutes suffered
from constitutional pitfalls like the statute in Furman. But, only three of those legislatures had managed to meet Justice Stewart's requirements that a
death penalty statute contain both "standards"
and flexibility in order to be constitutional.
Justice Stewart's Punishment Theory

Justice Stewart's opinions and voting patterns
establish two closely related minimum criteria for
a constitutional death penalty statute. First, a statute had to provide distinct proceedings for the
determination of guilt or innocence and the decision to impose the death penalty or a lesser penalty.
In Gregg, Justice Stewart thus upheld a statute that
required a separate penalty hearing before judge
and jury after a judgment that the offender had
committed first degree murder. Under the Georgia
statute at issue there, the judge was required to
impose the jury's recommended sentence.2 In Proffitt, the second case, Justice Stewart joined Justice
Powell's plurality opinion upholding a Florida
statute similar to Georgia's statute. In contrast to
the Georgia statute, however, the Florida scheme
permitted the trial judge to reject or accept the
jury's recommendations on sentence since its role
in the separate sentencing proceeding was merely
advisory.30 The Texas statute upheld by the same
plurality in an opinion by Justice Stevens inJurek
was a variation on the Florida and Georgia statutes.
As in the Georgia statute, the jury had ultimate
authority to impose the death penalty. But unlike
either the Florida or Georgia statutes, the Texas
statute did not contain a list of "aggravating circumstances," although it did require the jury to
answer three questions about the offender and his
1
crime before the death penalty could be imposed.
Justice Stewart's second minimal condition for
the constitutionality of death penalty statutes was
the requirement of appellate review of the decision
to impose death. All three statutory schemes under
27 428 U.S. at 306 (White, J., dissenting); 428 U.S. at
363 (White, J., dissenting).
2a 428 U.S. at 207 (White, J., concurring); 428 U.S. at
260 (White, J., concurring); 428 U.S. at 277 (White, J.,
concurring).
29
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3102, 27-2514 (Supp. 1975).
30 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West Supp. 1976-1977).
" TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon
Supp. 1975-1976).
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consideration provided for some form of appellate,
review and approval of the imposition of the death
penalty on any given individual. For example,
Georgia's highest court was required to review the
jury's decision on death to determine if three gen-

eral standards had been met. 2 Moreover, the Florida statute required automatic appellate review in
all cases where the death sentence was imposed,
but, unlike the Georgia statute, it lacked specific
criteria for the court to apply.33 Justice Powell's
opinion in Proffitt relied upon the fact that the trial
judge, who had ultimate sentencing authority, was
required to state his reasons for imposing the death
penalty. Because of this requirement, Justice Powell reasoned that the appellate court could engage
in meaningful review of the decision.3 Finally, the
Texas statute, like the Georgia statute, required
expedited appeal of any death sentence, but did
not formulate standards of review.s Justice Stevens' opinion injurek took the view that the high
court in Texas had interpreted the legislative

scheme so that the jury's answer to the three questions required it to consider the same aggravating
and mitigating factors as the Florida statutess
In the plurality's view, all three state high courts
had assumed the role of ultimate supervisor of the
administration of the death penalty.37 Justice Stewart believed that this ensured the structuring of the
decision in accordance with legislative standards.ss
32

The Georgia statute reads in part:

(c) With regard to the sentence, the court shall
determine:
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed

under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any
other arbitrary factor, and
(2) Whether, in cases other than treason or aircraft hijacking, the evidence supports the jury's or
judge's finding of a statutory aggravating circum-

stance as enumerated in section 27.2534.1(b), and
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3537 (Supp. 1975).
33 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4) (West Supp. 19761977).

u 428 U.S. at 250-53 (plurality opinion by justice
Powell).
'Tax. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon
Supp. 1975-1976).

- 428 U.S. at 270-74 (plurality opinion by Justice
Stevens).
37Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 204-06 (plurality
opinion by Justice Stewart); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.

at 253 (plurality opinion by Justice Powell); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. at 273-74 (plurality opinion by Justice
Stevens).
"Justice Stewart's opinion in Gregg did not explicitly
require appellate review of the decision to impose death.
However, he did state that "to guard against a situation
comparable to that presented in Furman, the Supreme

His opinion in Gregg referred to the fact that state
appellate courts had functioned as ultimate arbiter
of the death penalties actually imposed and had
invalidated the death penalty for some crimes.'
Appellate review of the Florida, Texas and Georgia
statutes then, had cured the "arbitrariness" and
"freakishness" of the statutes that Justice Stewart
had condemned in Furman.
On the other hand, mandatory death penalties
failed to meet Justice Stewart's test of minimal
4
standards. In Woodson v. North Carolina,"
Stewart's
plurality opinion held unconstitutional a statute
requiring the imposition of the death penalty in
every case of murder.4 ' According to Stewart, the
underlying purpose of the two criteria established
in Gregg, Proffitt andJurek, insuring structured "individualization" of the death penalty decision,
could not be met by a statutory scheme that did
not provide for bifurcated proceedings. 42 Without
providing appellate review of the death penalty as
a separate and distinct issue, the North Carolina
Stewart to be
statute in Woodson was thus held by
3
lacking in "objective standards."
In Roberts v. Louisiana," Stewart joined Justice
Stevens' plurality opinion which invalidated a
mandatory death penalty for murder despite the
changes in adjudicatory aspects of murder designed
to guide the jury's determination of murder. Because death was automatic upon finding of first
degree murder, the statute mandated that the jury"
must be instructed 6n all "lesser included offenses"
in every unlawful homicide prosecution, regardless
of the defendant's request or the evidence. The
Louisiana statute also required the jury to return
a "responsive verdict" as to which form of homicide
it had found.45 Justice Stevens believed that this
Court of Georgia compares each death sentence with the
sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants to
insure that the sentence of death in a particular case is
not disproportionate." 428 U.S. at 198. Thus, if Justice
Stewart's opinion in Gregg is read in light of his opinion
in Furman, the failure of the state to provide for appellate
review would mean every case would present a constitutional issue of "arbitrariness" for some federal court. In
addition, since Justice Stewart's theory holds most mandatory schemes unconstitutional, the state's choices of
methods for imposing death without federal review must
include some form of appellate review.
19 428 U.S. at 203, 205-06 (plurality opinion by Justice
Stewart).
4428 U.S. 280 (1976).
41 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1976).
42 428 U.S. at 303-05 (plurality opinion by Justice
Stewart).
43 Id. at 303.
" 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
45 428 U.S. at 332 (plurality opinion by Justice Stevens).
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type of adjudication interfered with the constitutional policy of individualization. 46 Removing all
sentencing authority regarding the death penalty
from a jury or trial judge was not considered as
curative of the Furman defects. As Stevens noted,
the Constitution requires, at least for the imposition
of the death penalty, a proceeding distinct from
the determination of guilt.
In essence, Justice Stewart's constitutional theory requires a legislature to make a considered
choice about the procedures for imposing the death
penalty. If it decides that the death penalty is a
necessary part of the criminal process, the legislature must be willing to expend the society's resources on the resolution of each and every case
where the state seeks to impose the death penalty.
Every accused offender must have not only the
opportunity to defend against the finding of "capital murder," but also an opportunity to be heard
on whether the death sentence should be imposed
on him both at the trial and appellate levels. Thus,
appellate courts occupy an important policy-making role under Justice Stewart's view.
Justice Stewart's theory is considered a theory of
"punishment" because it focuses on the methods of
imposing the death penalty. This theory requires
that those methods further not only the goals of
retribution or deterrence, but also the goal of "individualization." In determining whether a statutory scheme provides sufficient "individualization"
of the sanction of death, Justice Stewart assumes
that the sentencing stage is the appropriate point
for individualization of the decision
rather than
7
the process of determining guilt.'

Justice White's "Responsibility" Theory
Taking a different viewpoint from Stewart, Justice White dissented from the invalidation of the
Louisiana and North Carolina mandatory death
penalty statutes. In Roberts, Justice White reasoned

that the Louisiana mandatory death statute was
constitutional because the legislature had removed

the jury's discretion to bring in the verdict of
"guilty without capital punishment" for the crime
of first-degree murder.48 This legislative change
cured the major defect that White had seen in the
Furman statute: it eliminated the potential for dis46 Id. at 335-36.
4' As will be discussed later, Justice Stewart's theory in

the second round of death penalty litigation is part of his
more general theory of the meaning of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause. His theory of that clause
focuses primarily on the decision to impose the sanction

rather than the requirements of criminal liability. See text
accompanying notes 181-200 infra.
48 428 U.S. at 346-50 (White, J., dissenting).
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criminatory and arbitrary infliction of the death
penalty. Since the North Carolina legislature had
also eliminated this traditional aspect of jury discretion in the administration of the death penalty,
Justice White's dissenting opinion in Woodson was
essentially a cross reference to his dissent in Roberrs."9 Thus, both of his dissents rejected the linchpin of Justice Stewart's analysis that a separation
of guilt determination and the penalty infliction
process is a precondition to a death penalty statute's constitutionality.
In concurring opinions, Justice White agreed
with the plurality that the Georgia, Florida and
Texas legislatures had chosen constitutionally permissible means of eliminating "wanton" and
"freakish" imposition of the death penalty. In
Gregg, White found the Georgia statute constitutional because the appellate court had exercised
the authority granted to it by the legislature to
review the infliction of the death penalty in the
cases before the Court." Similarly, White's concurrence in Proffitt argued that the Florida statute
required the trial judge to impose the death penalty
on all first degree murders meeting the statutory
standards. He thus interpreted the Florida statute
as "mandating" the death penalty.51 Furthermore,
in Jurek, White interpreted the Texas statute as
requiring the imposition of the death penalty if the
jury answered52two of the three statutory questions
affirmatively.
Once adequate standards had been set, it was
not relevant under White's theory whether the
standards were applied by a jury, a trial judge or
an appellate court. The setting of clear standards
thus cured the Furman defects. For White, the essential problem for the Court was to determine if
the state's system of decisionmaking can distinguish
those murderers who deserve death from those who
deserve a lesser punishment. The problem has two
dimensions. First,Justice White looked for evidence
that the legislature had established standards in
sufficient detail describing the circumstances in
which an offender is liable for the death penalty.
All five statutes met this threshold requirement.
For instance, affirmative answers to the following
two questions:
(1) Whether the conduct of the defendant that
caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with reasonable expectation that
death of the deceased or another would result;
49428 U.S. at 306-07 (White, J., dissenting).

"o428 U.S. at 222-24 (White, J., concurring).
5"428 U.S. at 260 (White, J., concurring).
52428 U.S. at 277-78 (White, J., concurring).
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(2) Whether there is a probability that the defendant

would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society;53
would focus sufficiently on the offender's character
and his crime to convince Justice White that any
person so selected has committed an atrocity, punishable by death."
Second, Justice White sought to determine if
those designated to apply the standards were capable of doing so. In his view, a jury was capable
of applying standards because of the "common
sense core meaning" of the questions in the Texas
statute.s Similarily, in the Louisiana case, Justice
White suggested that the "lesser included offense
provisions" criticized by the plurality 5 would not
interfere with the jury's role as the conscience of
the community in criminal cases.57 In the Florida
case, White asserted that the trial judge's sentencing, according to statutory provisions of aggravating and mitigating factors, would lead to regular,
as opposed to freakish, imposition of the death
penalty. As a result, in his view, the death penalty
remained a credible deterrent to crimea because
trial judges and juries could be expected to perform
their function of applying definite standards. As a
consequence of his confidence in appellate courts,
Justice White simply reviewed the record in Gregg
to determine if the state court had performed its
statutorily assigned task of eliminating cases of
discriminatory or arbitrary infliction of the death
penalty. After these constitutionally impermissible
factors were eliminated, Justice White assumed
that the jury had found that the offender deserved
the death penalty after weighing statutorily iden59
tified mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
Justice White's analysis is labeled a theory of
"criminal responsibility," despite the confusion engendered by the term, ° because his focus requires
the Court to balance social interest against the
individual offender's interest in his life. White's
overall analysis is concerned primarily with
whether those who should die as a result of their
crime are condemned. He is more concerned that
these persons are condemned than with whether
the system makes a "mistake" and condemns a
Id. at 277.
Id. at 279.
TEax. CODE CRIM.PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071 (b) (Vernon
Supp. 1975-1976).
5 Roberts, 428 U.S. at 334-35 (plurality opinion by
Justice
Stevens).
5
7 Id. at 347-48. (White, J., dissenting).
5 Profitt, 428 U.S. at 260-61. (White, J., concurring).
'9 428 U.S. at 224 (White, J., concurring).
6 See Lasswell & Donnelly, supra note 8, at 875.
53

murderer who does not deserve the penalty. In his
analysis, the decision to condemn a murderer to
die is a collective decision of legislatures and the
administrators of the criminal process-prosecutors, juries, trial judges, probation officials, etc.
Justice White's theory does not assume, as does
Justice Stewart's theory, that the Court's role is to
impose particular procedures for administering the
death penalty. Rather, in White's view, the Court's
primary duty is to assess the overall system of
decisionmaking to determine whether minimal
criteria of criminal responsibility are met. Justice
White's opinion in Furman and the second round of
litigation over the death penalty indicates that the
constitutionality of death penalty legislation is dependent upon the capacity of the criminal law
process to effect a legislative mandate that the
death penalty is a necessary part of the criminal
justice system."1
B. Interpretations of Pre-Furman Precedents
In the second round of death penalty litigation,
both Justices indicated that the Court's 1971 opinion in McGaulha v. California,62 in which they had
both joined, offered support for their respective
theories. McGautha upheld the constitutionality of
the type of discretionary death penalty statutes
under the fourteenth amendment63 that Furman
condemned as unconstitutional under the eighth
and fourteenth amendments a year later. The differing interpretations of McGautha held by Justices
Stewart and White illustrate their fundamental
disagreement as to the requirements of the eighth
amendment's' Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause and the fourteenth amendment's Due Process Clause. An examination of the Court's two preMcGautha procedural due process cases involving
the death penalty6 reveals the fundamental difference as to how each Justice defines due process in
a way that McGautha masks. Examination of the
two non-death penalty eighth amendment cases6s
6' As developed later, Justice White held these statutes
that do not meet his minimal standards of criminal
responsibility in the manner in which "capital murder"
is defined unconstitutional on that ground alone. See
Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2981 (1978) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See text accompanying notes 192-99 infra.
62 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
63
Id. at 196.
64United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). See text accompanying notes 88-109 infra.
.65 Compare Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)
with Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). See text
accompanying notes 110-64 infra.
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reveals a similar disagreement on the perimeters of
the eighth amendment.
Differing Views of McGautha

In the Louisiana mandatory death penalty case,
Justice White cited McGautha as support for his
basic theory.6 In McGautha, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of statutes that allowed juries to
impose the death penalty without any legislative
standards setting permissible considerations for the
making of that determination.67 In a companion
case, the Court also upheld the constitutionality of
statutes that allowed juries to determine in one
proceeding whether the defendant was guilty and
whether the death penalty or life imprisonment
should be imposed. 68 For Justice White, McGautha
stood for the proposition that the Due Process
Clause does not require bifurcation of trial and
death penalty proceedings.69 If bifurcation is the
cornerstone of Justice Stewart's procedural analysis, Justice White's view of McGautha thus renders
the case inconsistent with Justice Stewart's punishment theory.
Justice Stewart's opinion in Woodson, declaring
mandatory death penalty unconstitutional, however, cited McGautha with approval.7" There was
nothing in any of his opinions indicating a sub
silentio disapproval of McGautha. Nor did Justice
Stewart indicate that he saw any fundamental
conflict between his participation in the Court's
opinion in McGautha and his plurality opinions in
Gregg and Woodson. 7

Justice Stewart's failure to perceive this conflict
can be explained in terms of one of the key concepts
66

Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 350-58 (1976)

(White, J., dissenting).
67402 U.S. 183, 196 (1971).
68 The Ohio procedure which permitted the guilt and
punishment determination to be made in a single unitary
proceeding, id. at 192, was also upheld as constitutional.
Id. at 196.
6 See note 66 supra.

' 0 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 297-98
(1976) (plurality opinion by Justice Stewart) (where
McGautha is used to demonstrate the nation's rejection of
mandatory death penalty schemes).
71In a long footnote in Gregg, Justice Stewart does
state:
While Furman did not overrule McGautha, it is clearly
in a substantial tension with a broad reading of
McGautha's holding. In view of Furman, McGautha
can be viewed rationally as a precedent only for the
proposition that standardless jury sentencing procedures were not employed in the cases there before
the Court so as to violate the Due Process Clause.
428 u.b. at 195-96 n.47.
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in his constitutional theory of punishment. In contrast to traditional analysis that asserts punishment
is a legislative function, 72 Justice Stewart's theory
maintains that both appellate courts and legisla-

tures are key policy makers in the administration
of the death penaity. 73 Once this fundamental
premise of Justice Stewart's theory is adopted,
McGautha is not inconsistent with his reasoning in
Gregg or Woodson. The petitioners in McGautha had
argued that legislatures are required by the fourteenth amendment to impose standards for jury
death penalty decisionmaking.7 " Justice Stewart's
response to that argument based solely on the Due
Process Clause was to join Justice Harlan's majority opinion in McGautha, rejecting the requirement
on legislatures. Justice Stewart's constitutional theory of death penalty decisionmaking would have
required the petitioners in McGautha to argue that
appellate courts must supervise the legislative standards used by juries to impose the death penalty
under the eighth and fourteenth amendments.75
The argument was unavailable since the petition
for certiorari in McGauthahad limited corisideration
76
of the issues solely to the Due Process Clause.
To make McGautha consistent with Justice Stew72 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) where Justice Blackmun expressed
the view of who can determine punishment under the
eighth amendment, in rather graphic terms: "Were I a
legislator, I would vote against the death penalty for the
policy reasons argued by counsel for the respective petitioners ....
Id. at 406.
Later in the opinion, he stated:
I do not sit on these cases, however, as a legislator,
responsive, at least in part, to the will of constituents. Our task here, as must so frequently be emphasized and re-emphasized, is to pass upon the
constitutionality of legislation that has been enacted
and that is challenged. This is the sole task for
judges.
Id. at 410-1 .
73
See text accompanying notes 29-47 supra.
74See Brief for Petitioner, at 17-19, McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
' In the same footnote in Gregg, Justice Stewart went
on to say:
We note that McGautha's assumption that it is
not possible to devise standards to guide and regularize jury sentencing in capital cases has been
undermined by subsequent experience. In view of
that experience and the considerations set forth in
the text, we adhere to Furman'sdetermination that
where the ultimate punishment of death is at issue
a system of standardless jury discretion violates the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
428 U.S. at 195-96 n.47.
76 398 U.S. 936 (1970).
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art's more fully developed constitutional theory of gives the Court the power to weigh various goals of
punishment, it should be intepreted as supporting
the criminal justice system, but not to lose sight of
this particularly narrow proposition: For the death
the fact that legislatures have primary authority to
penalty to be constitutionally imposed under both
determine the culpability of offenders under the
the Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punish- Due Process Clause. Since the due process concerns
ment Clauses, appellate review of the decision to are given primacy in Justice White's analysis, he
impose death must be part of the decisionmaking
interpreted McGautha as support for his theory of
process. Although a statute without specific legis- criminal responsibility.
lative standards for appellate courts to apply in
Integrating McCautha into both Justices' theories
deciding whether to impose death may be consti- creates a dilemma. McGautha can be explained in
tutional as in Jurek, Justice Stewart would permit terms of Justice Stewart's theory only if we accept
only those death penalty schemes where appellate his assumption that the Due Process and Cruel and
courts assume the role of supervising the standards Unusual Punishment Clauses point in the same
for imposing death to be constitutional.7 Stewart
direction-towards the goal of individualizing
believed that appellate court supervision of legis- punishment. In Justice White's view, the eighth
lative standards is in fact a necessary condition to amendment goal of individualization of punishthe constitutionality of death penalty statutes. His ment is subsumed under the due process goal of
analysis in Gregg and Woodson thus furthered what
general deterrence. According to White, due proche perceived as the underlying goal of McGauthaess allows legislatures to authorize death penalty
individualization of punishment-by requiring
for "deserving murders" through any system that
procedures that ensure such individualized deci- has enough regularity of imposition to insure that
sionmaking.
the death penalty has a general deterrent effect.
Justice White saw McGautha as defining the basic Jury discretion to withhold the death penalty is
goals which the Consititution allows the state to
not itself determinative of that issue if the legislaseek in authorizing the death penalty. For him, ture has properly structured the jury's decision.
McGautha did not alter what he referred to as an The question remains, however, as to how the
"axiom" of constitutional law: Some crimes are so
Court should determine how much and what kind
serious that the legislature may exclude consideraof discretion is allowable in the furtherance of
tion of the character of the individual offender in general deterrence.
deciding whether to impose the death penalty. 78
Justice White's opinion in Roberts, along with his
Justice White's axiom is explicitly derived from the opinions in other cases, provides some hints as to
Due Process Clause since McGautha was decided
how he would answer this question. In Roberts, the
solely under the fourteenth amendment. As he jury's ability to ignore instructions in adjudicating
asserted in his dissent in Roberts, even if the goal of the crime, that the plurality criticized, was not
Justice Stewart's theory-individualization-is re- viewed by White as unconstitutional. This position
quired by the eighth amendment, the state's inter- rested on his interpretation of McGautha and the
est in deterring others from committing crimes lack of any evidence of the jury's systematic refusal
outweighs the state's interest in individualization.
to follow instructions. Nor did the prosecutorial
Thus, under Justice White's interpretation, the power to select persons for prosecution, the practice
Due Process Clause allows the state to use general of plea bargaining or the practice of executive
deterrence as a goal to justify enacting a particular
clemency, render the statutes infirm in Justice
death penalty scheme.79 The eighth amendment
White's analysis.'s Citing cases dealing with plea
bargaining8 ' and cases dealing with harsher sentences on retrial,s 2 White asserted that due process
7 One possible exception to this statement might be
also did not invalidate the challenged methods of
the case of mandatory death penalty for a life prisoner.
Justice Stewart has consistently indicated that the con- discretion. Only those kinds of specific discretionstitutionality of such a statute is still an open question in ary powers that interfere with legitimate goals of
his view. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
80Id. at 348. None of these practices violated the eighth
280, 292-93 n.25 (1976) (plurality opinion by Justice
Stewart); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (per amendment in his view because he had rejected the
curiam opinion invalidating statute mandating death for primacy of the goal of individualization of punishment
killing police officer in course of his duty).
in constitutional analysis.
7 Roberts, 428 U.S. at 358. (White, J., dissenting).
8' Id. at 349.
Sid..
82id.
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the criminal process would render a death penalty
3
statute unconstitutional.8
White's concurring opinion in Gregg and his
dissent in Roberts are both replete with references
to the adjudicative aspects of the trial. 84 His elaborate statement of the facts in both cases indicated
an unexpressed concern about the "fairness" of the
adjudication. In Gregg, Justice White even discussed the jury instructions on murder when no
question of adjudication was even considered in
the petition for certiorari. 85 Similarly in Roberts, he
included in his opinon the jury charges as well as
86
elaborate discussions of the witnesses' testimony.
Thus, Justice White appears to have invited discussion of these trial issues to assure himself that
no constitutional issues of adjudication existed in
the case. 7
ProceduralDue Process

Aside from their interpretations of McGautha,
Justices White and Stewart generally differ in their
beliefs as to the requirements for procedural due
process in the sentencing context. In United States v.
Jackson,ss for example, the Court, in an opinion by
Justice Stewart, invalidated a portion of the federal
kidnapping statute that allowed juries, but not
trial judges, to impose the death penalty.89 Stewart
reasoned that the statute burdened the exercise of
the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial
because if the defendant waived the jury right, he
could avoid the possibility of a death penalty.
Thus, in Stewart's view, the statute encouraged a
choice against exercising one's right to a full adversary adjudication.90 The result reached by Justice Stewart was to sever the death penalty provision rather than declare the entire statutory scheme
unconstitutional as the district court had done.9 '
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What is significant about this opinion is that
Stewart took what was a systematic constitutional
attack on a statute and transformed it into an issue
solely of sentencing authority. The petitioner in
Jackson had moved for a dismissal of the indictment
because of the statute's unconstitutionality.9 Justice Stewart, however, eliminated the death penalty from the statute and simply allowed the petitioners to plead anew to the indictment without

the risk of a death penalty.93
Justice White wrote the only dissent in Jackson,
arguing that the statute should have been held
constitutional. 94 According to White, if the vice of
the statute was that some people's choice of seeking
a jury trial was burdened, the solution existed in
adhering to constitutional standards for the taking
95
of guilty pleas and waivers of jury. What was
significant about Justice White's opinion was that
he stated the constitutional issues in terms of adjudicative or pre-adjudicative issues. He was unable to adopt Justice Stewart's systematic view of
the operation of the statutory scheme that assumed
an interaction of legislative standards for imposing
the death penalty with the defendant's actions at
96
the pleading and adjudicative aspects of trial.
A second case illustrating the same divergence
in framing of an issue appeared in Witherspoon v.
Illinois.9 7 There, Justice Stewart, again writing for

the Court, held that due process prevented the
imposition of the death penalty by a jury which
excluded all persons who opposed the death penalty.98 The petitioners had argued that a "death
qualified jury," resulting from a process when all
persons professing a disbelief in capital punishment
were successfully challenged for cause on voir dire
by the prosecution, was unconstitutional. 99 Stewart
s'Id. at 571.
93
Id. at 591.

8 See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 364
(White, J., concurring). See text accompanying notes 181-

9 390 U.S. at 591 (White, J., dissenting) (joined by
Justice Black).

88 infra.
84 428 U.S. at 212-20 (White, J., concurring); 428 U.S.

95 Id. at 592.
' Had the issue in Jackson solely been that of "voluntariness" of the waiver of right to trial, Justices Stewart
and White apparently would have been in complete
agreement. In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742

at 339-44 (White, J., dissenting).
85 428 U.S. at 215-16 n.4 (White, J., concurring).
86 428 U.S. at 340-44 (White, J., dissenting).
87 Interestingly, all five cases involved the taking of
human life during the commission of another felony.
Thus, lurking beneath the surface in all cases was the old
and continuing debate surrounding the nature and purposes of the "felony murder" doctrine. See, e.g., Morris,
The Felon's Responsibilityfor the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U.
PA. L. REv. 50 (1956).
"8390 U.S. 570 (1968).
Id. at 570-72.
9 Id. at 571-72.
9 Id. at 591.

(1970), Justice White wrote for the Court, holding the
petitioner's plea of guilty to a federal kidnapping charge
constitutional under the statute partially invalidated in
Jackson. Justice White reasoned that the plea had been
"voluntarily" received by the trial judge, id. at 749-51.
Justice Stewart joined this opinion, apparently because
the issue was solely that of the constitutional standard
for97"voluntariness."
391 U.S. 510 (1968).
Id. at 522-23.
'9 Id. at 516.
9
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agreed with this characterization of the results of
the voir dire selection process since no inquiry was
made as to whether the jurors could nonetheless
return a death penalty verdict.1i But Stewart rejected the petitioners argument that the "death
qualified jury" was more likely to render a guilty
verdict on the substantive offense. While rejecting
the petitioners' due process-fair trial claim, Justice
Stewart fashioned a new remedy. He reversed the
death penalty as unconstitutional on the grounds
that the jury, without the inclusion of any persons
with religious or conscientious objections to the
death penalty, was organized to impose death.'0 '
As a result of Stewart's framing and analyzing of
the issue, the petitioners were granted a new sentence of life
imprisonment rather than the death
02 ,
sentence.
Justice White expressed disagreement with the
Stewart approach in two ways. First, he joined
Justice Black's dissent, which argued that the statute's process of jury selection produced an impartial jury on the issue of death.1t Justice Black also
attacked Stewart's implication of constitutional unfairness in the process by pointing out that the
petitioners' own able counsel failed to attack the
jury 4in the manner invalidated by Justice Stewart.

10

Second, White wrote his own dissenting opinion, 1 5 which was in the form of a short essay
defending the legislature's delegation of the death
penalty decision to a certain kind ofjury.°6 Justice
White reasoned that the legislative vote to authorize a death penalty had included those opposed to
the death penalty for whatever ground. Having
decided to retain the death penalty by majority
vote, the exclusion of the minority from the jury
was a means of maintaining the traditional policy
that jury verdicts be unanimous. 0 7 He considered
the exclusion of those who could "hang a jury" as
justifiable because one such citizen on ajury could
prevent a decision to impose death and as a result
the penalty would never be imposed. Although
White generally agreed with Justice Black's analysis of the fairness of the particular jury in Witherspoon, he sought to preserve the possibility that
'0 Id. at 520-21.
101Id.

m'2Id, at 523-24 n.21.
'03

391 U.S. at 532 (Black, J., dissenting, joined by

Justice White).

Id. at 533-34.
U.S. at 540 (White, J., dissenting).
'06 Id. at 541-42.
107id.

'04

i'

391

some juries may be unconstitutionally composed. 1°8

He indicated that some legislative delegations of
the death penalty decisonmaking powers were
probably unconstitutional, but other delegationssuch as to a non-unanimous jury-were probably
constitutional' °9
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Prior to Furman,the Court, with Justices Stewart
and White participating, decided two cases involving the application of the eighth amendment's
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to state
cases. In Robinson v. California,"0 Justice Stewart
wrote for a plurality of the Court and held the
imposition of ajail term on an individual found to
be a "narcotics addict" unconstitutional under the
eighth and fourteenth amendments."i Justice
White wrote one of the dissenting opinions, disagreeing with Stewart's interpretation of the Court's
2
role under the eighth amendment." In Powell v.
Texas,"' a plurality of the Court upheld the constitutionality of a Texas penal statute" 4 prohibiting public drunkenness as it applied to a "chronic
alcoholic." This time, Justice White wrote a concurring opinion" 5 joining the plurality, relying on
his interpretation of Robinson to indicate the circumstances when the Court could invalidate a conviction for public drunkenness. Justice Stewart joined
in the dissenting opinion in Powell, which interpreted Robinson as prohibiting any "punishment"
of "sick" individuals, be they "narcotic addicts" or
"chronic alcoholics" under the eighth amend6
ment. 1
Justice Stewart viewed Robinson from a perspective that assumes a conflict between a "medical"
and "punitive" model of social control over narcotic addiction. 1 7 There, a Los Angeles police officer had arrested the defendant Robinson after
stopping a car in which he was a passenger for a
traffic violation.1i 8 During the course of his investigation, the officer testified that he observed "scar
'0aId. at 541 n.1.
'09 Id. at 542 n.2.
110370 U.S. 660 (1962).

...
Id. at 667.
112Id. at 685 (White, J., dissenting).
"' 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
. Tx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 477 (Vernon 1952)
(repealed 1973).
115392 U.S. at 548 (White, J., concurring).
"6Id. at 554 (Fortas, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart
and Brennan, JJ.).
117See, e.g., Fingarette, Addiction and CriminalResponsibili!y. 84 YALE L. J. 413 (1975).
"' 370 U.S. at 661.
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tissue and discoloration" on Robinson's arms. The
arresting officer also testified that Robinson admitted using narcotics. Following Robinson's arrest,1 9 an officer from the narcotics bureau examined Robinson's arms. At trial this narcotics officer
testified that, based on his ten years of experience
in the field, in his opinion the marks were caused
by the use of non-sterile hypodermic needles. Although the narcotics officer stated that Robinson
was neither under the influence of drugs nor suffering from withdrawal symptoms at the time of
the examination, he admitted having used narcotics recently. However, Robinson testified denying
ever using narcotics and explained the condition
of his arms as resulting from an allergic condition.
°
Two witnesses corroborated his testimony.'
On the basis of these facts, Justice Stewart assumed that the jury had been asked to find Robinson addicted to heroin in a physiological sense.
This assumption was made despite the fact that
the state made no effort to prove physiological
addiction through the presentation of the results of
medical testing, nor did it offer any evidence of
Robinson's physiological dependence on narcotics. 12 ' Despite this lack of evidence, Justice Stewart's opinion assumed and asserted that "narcotics
addiction is an illness. ' ' 22 The assumption was
necessary for his reasoning by analogy that any
time in jail for the "patient," Larry Robinson,
would have been similar to jailing a person for a
"common cold." 123
One of the operative effects of Justice Stewart's
perspective of a conflict between methods of social
control is that he arguably misanalyzed the purpose of the California legislative scheme that he
declared unconstitutional. Without any discussion,
Justice Stewart blissfully characterized the statute
under consideration, a provision of the California
Health and Safety Code, as imposing a "criminal
1S Robinson was arrested for violating the California
Health and Safety Code, which provided in part that:
"No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be
addicted to the use of narcotics ... " CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1172 (repealed in 1972). For violating

this statute, Robinson was subject to 90 days in jail and
two years of subsequent parole.
1 370 U.S. at 662.
121The major issue in the trial below concerned the
constitutionality of the "search" by the arresting officer.
The Court declined to consider this issue. Id. at 661 n.2.
The testimony in the trial below in Robinson is reprinted
in J. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWTIZ & R. SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND PRArICE 229-42 (1974).
'22 370 U.S. at 667.
123id.
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offense"' 24 and assumed that its purposes were
totally punitive. Of course, the use of jails as a
sanction and the police as invoking agents, under
the statute, might have supported this characterization and his assumption of the statute's purpose.125 But if we analyze the statute in the context
of the total legislative scheme for dealing with
"narcotic addiction," Justice Stewart's assumption
about the purposes of the statute are at least seriously questioned.
At the time of Robinson, California had another
statute permitting the involuntary committment of
narcotics addicts.'26 That statute, a provision of the
California Welfare and Institution Code, defined
a narcotics addict as "any person who habitually
takes or otherwise uses to the extent of having lost the
power of self-control certain narcotic drugs."' 2 7 The
statute involved in Robinson, on the other hand, had
no statutory definition of addiction but the trial
judge had defined the term for the jury as follows:
"The word 'addicted' means, strongly disposed to
some taste or practice or habituated, especially to
drugs. In order to inquire as to whether a person is
addicted to the use ofnarcotics isin effect an inquiry as to
' 1
his habit in that regard. 28
The distinction between these two definitions of
addiction is between what might be called a "voluntary addict" and an "involuntary addict." The
voluntary or habitual addict defined in Robinson in
some sense chooses to use narcotics, whereas the
involuntary addict of the Health Welfare and Institution Code uses the drugs because hehas lost
control of his ability to choose in this particular
regard.129
Using the distinction between the two statutory
definitions of addiction, it was possible for a judge
to analyze the social control functions of the two
statutes as congruent rather than conflicting. For
example, as Justice Clark pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Robinson, the legislature sought
to cure only the involuntary addict through invol°
Under the involuntary
untary confinement."
commitment statute, a confined person was discharged after a minimum of three months if treat124 id.
1s

See note 121 supra.

" See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE

§ 5350 (repealed

1965).
27
' Id. (emphasis added).
'
370 U.S. at 680 (Clark, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
'29 Id. at 681.
'30 Id. at 681-83.
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19791

ment was not deemed possible and the person was
considered "not dangerous."': The significant feature of this statute's means of effectuating ."treatment" through coercive means was a recognition
that treatment may not be possible. Such a view of
achieving treatment also was a recognition that
treatment is sought for social ends or as a means of
social control.
If the involuntary confinement process for treatment and social protection was thus viewed as a
social control mechanism, a judge perhaps could
also have analyzed the social control purposes of
the "voluntary addiction" statute involved in Robinson. Justice Clark engaged in such an analysis
and suggested that the underlying social control
purpose of the statute was to encourage persons to
32
exercise self-control in choosing not to use drugs.'
He justified the use of a minimum jail term as a
sanction upon a person like the defendant Robinson on the view that the negative sanction could
modify his choice to use drugs. The two-year parole
period that followed the jail term also involved
tests to determine if he had changed his habits
regarding heroin use." 8 This view of the purpose
of the statute explained the lack of reliance on
expert medical testimony by the state in Robinson,
as well as the state's use of negative sanctions plus
surveillance.
Whether or not one agrees with his answer,
Justice Clark, at least, perceived the questions of
legislative purpose in Robinson. On the other hand,
Justice Stewart failed even to acknowledge this
question because of the clear dichotomy in his
analysis between "medical" and "punitive" methods of social control. Stewart even intimated in a
footnote that the civil procedures should have been
utilized in Robinson's casel"" without any discus13
sion of the constitutionality of those procedures.
Furthermore, any use of criminal disposition ap11 CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 5355.1 (repealed 1965).
'32370 U.S. at 680-81 (Clark, J., dissenting). See alsoJ.
WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME

126-33 (1975).

Robinson's actual sentence included a ninety day,
jail term and a two year period of parole. One of the
conditions of his parole was that he submit to a Nalline
test. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERsHowrrz, & R. SCHWARTz
supra note 121, at 242.
133

'

370 U.S. at 665 n.7.

The Court has never directly decided on the constitutionality of narcotic civil commitment proceedings.
State courts have considered constitutional challenges to
schemes and generally upheld them. See, e.g., In the
Matter of Narcotics Addiction Control Commission v.
James, 22 N.Y.2d 545, 551, 293 N.Y.S.2d 531, 535-36,
240 N.E.2d 29, 32 (1968).

parently leads him to characterize the process as
"punishment" and thus in conflict with his preferred goal of rehabilitation. 13
The tentative term "apparent" is used here to
explain Justice Stewart's result in Robinson, because
his precise holding has never been clarified.
Through his use of the term "punishment," there
exist numerous questions concerning when the
Constitution permits the use of the criminal process. Although Justice Stewart found constitutional
fault with the addiction portion of the statute, he
explicitly asserted without explanation that the
state can use the criminal process to prohibit "the
unauthorized manufacture, prescription, sale, purchase, or possession of narcotics."' 3 7 Moreover, one
wonders what Stewart meant by "punishment"
when, by the way of dictum in Robinson, he gave a
constitutional blessing to the involuntary commitment of narcotics addicts. Simple deprivation of an
individual's liberty by the state was apparently not
the equivalent of punishment in Justice Stewart's
view. Finally, the precise nature of the constitutional defect in the statute in Robinson was unclear.
Was the infirmity in the use of criminal process in
"convicting" a person of "addiction" or in the use
of jail as a place of confinement? State courts
interpreted the statute's constitutional defect as the
use of penal facilities for addicts.'- 8 On the other
hand, other Supreme Court justices have interpreted the defect in the California statutory scheme
to be in the labelling of the addicted person a
"criminal" by the legal process.3 8 To answer the
question one way as opposed to the other has
significant impact on whether one thinks the primary impact of the eighth amendment will be on
the "adjudicative"
or "dispositive" aspects of crim40
inal process.
136 370
3

U.S. at 667 n.8.
664-65.

' 7 Id. at

"a See, e.g., In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 378 P.2d
793, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963).
'39 See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. at 678
(Harlan, J., concurring).
40 The adjudicative parts of the criminal process include all issues decided at trial and in appellate review of
the trial process. The dispositive aspects of the criminal
process include any decision where the legal system authorizes an official to exercise direct control over individuals. Under this definition, trial judge sentencing isessentially part of a larger category of legal decisions that
include decisions by prison and parole officials and even
decisions by officials in a civil commitment process. For
a discussion of the implications of the distinction between
dispositive and adjudicative decision making, see Palmer,

A Model of Criminal Dispositions: An Alternative to Official
Discretion in Sentencing, 62 GEo. L. J. 1 (1973); Palmer, The
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Despite assertions by Justice Stewart to the contrary,Justice White's dissent in Robinson interpreted
Stewart's opinion as raising serious doubts about
the state's ability to prohibit the use of narcotics as
opposed to the purchase, possession or sale. White
believed that voluntary use was a necessary precondition to addiction, except in the rare instance of
legitimate medical addiction.14 ' Thus, if addiction
failed the constitutional test, a criminal statute
punishing use must also fail the constitutional test.
Neither statute would be unconstitutional under
White's analysis, however, because he interpreted
the issue in Robinson in terms of "responsibility."
For Justice White, the essential question in Robinson
was whether the state convicted a person of addic14 2
tion who had not lost his power of self-control.
By framing the issue in this manner, Justice
White adopted Justice Clark's interpretation of the
statute and then looked for actual evidence of lack
of self-control. Finding no such evidence in the
record, he consequently concluded that the Court
should have affirmed the conviction. 4 3 According
to White, the ultimate issue of responsibility was a
Court, and not a legislative, problem. His view of
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in Robinson was thus very similar to the common law
requirement of "voluntariness" before criminal
conviction.14

White's constitutional theory of responsibility
under the eighth amendment was made even
clearer by his statement in Powell v. Texas. 145 There,
the Court, in a plurality opinion written by Justice
Marshall, upheld the imposition of a criminal
fine 146 on a "chronic alcoholic" under the Texas
Penal Code prohibiting public drunkenness.' 47 The
defendant in Powell had been arrested and jailed
pending trial the next morning for being intoxiAppellate Court Role in Mandatory Sentencing, 26 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 301 (1979).

Using this distinction, Justice White's theory of the
eighth amendment could be characterized as primarily
concerned with adjudicative issues in relation to the
disposition of death. See text accompanying notes 48-61
supra. Justice Stewart's theory of the eighth amendment
could be characterized as primarily concerned with the
dispositive issues of the death penalty. See text accompanying notes 29-47 supra.
14' 370 U.S. at 688-89 (White, J., dissenting).
142Id. at 688.
"4 Id. at 687-88.
144id.
'5

392 U.S. 514 (1968).

" Petitioner had been fined $50 upon conviction. Id.
at 517 (plurality opinion by Justice Marshall).
147TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 477 (Vernon 1952)
(repealed 1973).
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cated in a public place. At the trial, the defense
presented an expert witness whose testimony was
the basis of the trial judge's finding of the fact that:
"'(1) That chronic alcoholism is a disease..

.;'

(2)

That a chronic alcoholic does not appear in public
by his own volition but under a compulsion symptomatic of the disease...; '(3) That Leroy Powell,
defendant herein, ... is afflicted with the disease of
chronic alcoholism."" ' The defendant also testiand
fied as to the history of his drinking problems'
149
his numerous arrests for drunkenness.
The state offered no contradictory expert testimony. On cross-examination of the defendant's
expert witness, the state elicited an opinion that
when the defendant was sober, he knew "the difference between right and wrong" and that the
first drink was a voluntary exercise of his will."W
The state's cross-examination of the defendant elicited an admission that he had one drink on the
morning of trial, and had discontinued after one
drink. The state's argument was simply that no
defense had been presented since the defendant
was "legally sane" under the state's test for insanity.' 5 ' Despite its findings of fact, the trial judge
accepted the state's view and ruled as a matter of
law that there was no defense. The trial judge
found52 the defendant guilty and imposed a $50
fine.'
Justice Marshall, for the plurality of the Court,
affirmed the conviction. In doing so, Marshall
interpreted Robinson only as prohibiting the use of
criminal sanctions where no act had been
proven.ts Since, in Powell, the state elicited evidence of voluntary drinking during its cross-examination, this was held sufficient to meet the act
requirement for criminal liability. Thus, Justice
Marshall took Robinson as standing for the proposition that the eighth amendment requires a distinction between an "Act" and a "Status" in criminal adjudication. 15 For the former, the criminal
process can be used, but the Constitution prohibits
a conviction solely on the basis of the latter.
Adopting a similar view that Robinson had dealt
with limitations on the adjudication of criminal
liability, Justice White's concurring opinion in
Powell pointed out specitcally the constitutional

'4

392 U.S. at 521.
519.

149Id. at

'50Id.at 519-20.
' 2 Id. at 520.
15 Id. at 517.
'53

'"

Id. at 532.
Id. at 532-34.
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perimeters of voluntariness, l 55 perhaps on the belief
that Justice Marshall had failed to do so.i15 Under
Justice White's theory of constitutional "voluntariness," if the record demonstrated the existence of
chronic disease and compulsion to drink, as well as
the inability to avoid public places, a conviction under
the Texas statute would be unconstitutional.' 5 7 He
recognized that a conviction for being drunk in a
public place would depend more often on economic
status than on the nature of the disease, but this
use of the Court's power to invalidate a conviction
of an "unfortunate" in a hypothetical case did not
trouble him.'S8 He voted for affirmance because
therecord in Powell failed to include evidence that
the defendant could not have gotten drunk 159
at
home-conduct not prohibited by the statute.
In giving Robinson precedential effect through his
concurring opinion in Powell, Justice White made
clear what was only implicit in his dissent in Robinson. As he stated in the opening paragraph of his
opinion:
If it cannot be a crime to have an irresistable compulsion to use narcotics, Robinson v. California, I do
not see how it can constitutionally be a crime to
yield to such a compulsion. Punishing an addict for
using drugs, convicts for addiction under a different
name. Distinguishing between the two crimes is like
forbidding criminal conviction for being sick with
flu or epilepsy but permitting punishment for running a fever or having a convulsion. Unless Robinson
is to be abandoned, the use of narcotics by an addict
must be beyond the reach of the criminal law.
Similarly, the chronic alcoholic with an irresistable
urge to consume alcohol should not be punishable
for drinking or for being drunk. 16°
Even though Justice White went on to distinguish
Powell's conviction from a conviction of a chronic
alcoholic with a compulsion to drink, he indicated
that when he does give operative effect to the
eighth amendment, it will be in terms of imposing
restraints on state's processes of criminal adjudication rather
than on its criminal dispositional
61
process.
'5 392 U.S. at 550-52 (White, J., concurring); see also
3 RUTCERS-CAMDEN L.J. 361 (1971).
'w 392 U.S. at 535 (plurality opinion by Justice Marshall).
157392 U.S. at 551-52 (White, J., concurring).
8 Id. at 551.

'9 Id. at 552-54.
'60 Id. at 548-49.
161 Id.

Not surprisingly, Justice Stewart, whose focus
under the eighth amendment is on the formal
sanctioning process, joined Justice Fortas' dissent
in Powell162 For Fortas, as for Justice Stewart,
Robinson stood for principles of punishment. As
Fortas argued, "[c]riminal penalties may not be
inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he
ispowerless to change."' 63 By this statement of
Robinson's principle, Justice Fortas, with Justice
Stewart's full concurrence, centered upon the actual infliction of the sanction on a person deemed
unable to change the condition for which he is
being "punished."
Unlike Justices Marshall and White, Justices
Fortas and Stewart accepted the trial court's "finding of facts" that alcoholism is a disease and the
individual defendant was suffering from this disease.' However, the Fortas-Stewart analysis must
get past these questions of the nature of criminal
liability in order to engage in meaningful constitutional discussion of imposing criminal sanctions.
The White-Marshall theory, on the other hand,
avoided acceptance of the trial court's findings.
According to them, discussion of formal sanctioning or the dispositive processes presupposes a clarification of the constitutional limits on defining
criminal liability.
As a result of their participation in Powell and
Robinson, both Justices Stewart and White had an
opportunity to give different interpretations of the
impact of the ever-elusive term "punishment" prior
to the specific litigation over the death penalty.
Justice White defined the issues in Powell and
Robinson in terms of the limitations on adjudicative
processes because of his standards of constitutional
responsibility. In those same cases, Justice Stewart
defined the issues in terms of the constitutional
limits on the state's imposition of a particular
sanction. This difference in defining issues indicates
a fundamental differing concept of the Court's role
under the eighth amendment.
II.

DEATH PENALTY CASES SINCE

1976

Since 1976, the Court has decided three major
cases involving the death penalty. In Coker v. Georgia,165 the Court invalidated a statute authorizing
the death penalty for the crime of rape. During the
same term, the Court found the procedures used to
impose the death penalty on a particular individ'62392

U.S. at 554 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
567 (emphasis added).
'64Id. at 557 n.1.
'65433 U.S. 584 (1977).
163Id. at
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ual unconstitutional in Gardner v. Florida." Last
term, in Lockett v. Ohio,'67 the Court invalidated a
death penalty statute because its definition of
"mitigating circumstances" was incompatible with
the standards for individualization set forth in
Gregg, Proffitt andJurek.
In all three of these new cases, Justices Stewart
and White agreed with the Court's judgments
declaring the death penalty unconstitutional, but
continued to demonstrate through their voting behavior and opinions fundamental difference in
their analytical approaches. In Lockett and Gardner,
Justice White wrote concurring opinions disagreeing with the reasoning of the plurality opinion that
Justice Stewart had joined. In Coker, however, Justice Stewart joined the plurality opinion ofJustice
White. This basic agreement in Coker simply indicates that there is common ground between the
two constitutional analyses.
Coker and the Balancing of Eighth Amendment Interests
In Coker, Justice White's plurality opinion held
that a statute authorizing the death penalty for the
crime of rape violated the eighth amendment,
because in such an instance death would be a
"grossly disproportionate" penalty in relationship
to the crime.'6 This conclusion was reached by
both Justice White and Justice Stewart despite the
fact that the death penalty had been imposed in
accordance with the same statutory procedures
they both had approved the previous term in Gregg.
In the factual circumstances of the case, the jury
found, that two of the three statutory aggravating
circumstances justified imposing the death penalty
on the defendant, Coker. First, he had previously
been convicted of a "capital felony."' 6 Coker had
been convicted of murder, rape, kidnapping and
aggravated assault. While serving sentences for
these crimes, he escaped and committed the crimes
involved in the instant case. Second, the jury found
that Coker had committed the rape while engaged
170
in another "capital felony or aggravated felony."
The record indicated that when he entered the
victim's house brandishing a board, he tied up her
husband and took his money and the keys to the
1 71
Thus, the
family car, prior to raping the victim.

jury found he had committed armed robbery, an
aggravated felony, while committing rape. The
'6430 U.S. 349 (1977).
in 9 8 S. Ct. 2954(1978).
433 U.S. at 592.
'69Id.
at 587-91.
'70 Id. at 589.
171Id. at 587.
'68
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third aggravating circumstance, that the rape was
committed "outrageously or wantonly" was not
alleged to be present because the record indicated
that the victim of Coker's rape was "unharmed."
For Justice White, "unharmed," in this context,
physically
meant only that she was not further
172
brutalized by Coker after the rape.
If the primary focus of Justice White's analysis
were whether the defendant deserved the death
penalty, the state's decision to put Coker to death
was hardly unreasonable. Justice White's theory of
the Court's authority under the eighth amendment, however, required more than a judgment
that the particular defendant deserves a severe
penalty, for he admitted in his opinion 'that Coker
deserved a severe sanction.!7" Under his constitutional analysis, since the legislature had authorized
the death penalty as opposed to another penalty,
it was the Court's function to balance the legislative
judgment against constitutional standards in determining whether "the punishment fits the
crime." Thus, history, the fact that other legisla74
tures had rejected the death penalty for rape,'
and the fact that Georgia juries and trial judges
seldom imposed the death penalty for rape were
considered significant in Justice White's conclusion' 75 that the death penalty was "disproportionate" punishment for the crime of rape.
Justice White's proportionality analysis was essentially a comparison of competing interests
served by, the criminal law. He acknowledged that
by sanctioning rape as a crime, the community
protects its interest in "personal integrity" and
"autonomy" as well as its interest in sexual integrity. 176 By invalidating the death penalty for rape,
White asserted that those interests' do not justify
taking the life of the rapist because of the community's general interest in protecting life. Only
the community's interest in life as exemplified in
the crime of murder, in his view, justified taking
the life of the offender. While the death penalty
for murder serves legitimate goals for the criminal
justice system, Justice White viewed the death
penalty as an "excessive" furtherance of those goals
if imposed for rape.17
Justice Stewart fully concurred in White's analysis in Coker, because Stewart's constitutional analysis of punishment involved in effect the same type
2Id.
73

Id. at 598.

1'74Id. at 593-96.
175Id. at 596-97.
176Id. at 597.
177Id. at 598.
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of analysis of competing goals with a slightly dif- judge to impose life imprisonment in Gardner's
ferent emphasis. At the heart of Justice Stewart's case because of the mitigating circumstances. The
analysis was an unarticulated equation about the trial judge had ordered a pre-sentence report
relationship of the goals of the criminal process. shortly after the jury retired to deliberate on the
The underlying purposes of his Gregg standards for
penalty. Several weeks after the jury's advisory
individualization were to preserve the hope of "rerecommendation of life imprisonment, the judge
78
habilitation" that he had mentioned in Furman.1
received the pre-sentence report. He then entered
Justice Stewart's emphasis on rehabilitation did
fihdings of fact and concluded that the murder
not necessarily mean that he thought a recidivist
had been committed under one of the statutory
like Coker could be rehabilitated. Rather, his use "aggravating circumstances" to wit, in "an espeof rehabilitation referred to the goals of the system
cially heinous and cruel manner.""Is The trial
and not to the specific treatability of an individ- judge relied in part on the confidential portions of
ual. 17 For Stewart, rehabilitation is a code name
the pre-sentence report that had not been disclosed
for preserving the value of "human dignity" within
to defense counsel. On appeal, the Florida court
the process of state control. 1° By preserving the life affirmed the death sentence after "carefully reviewof a rapist,Justice Stewart indicated that the social ing the record." The record on appeal, however,
control goals of the criminal law are limited by
did not contain the confidential portion of the preconstitutional norms or values. Although Stewart sentence report.1sa
sought to further those norms by first asking quesJustice Stevens reasoned that the imposition of
tions about the procedures for sanctions, he would
the death penalty on Gardner violated due process
enforce those norms when they are challenged
because the constitutionality of the death penalty
directly by state legislatures and courts. Thus the was dependent upon its fair administration.' 84 In
issue in Coker, where the state had adopted proce- his view, due process required the trial judge to
dures he had already approved in Gregg, was disclose fully the contents of the report to ensure
whether the state can justify taking the life of the its accuracy in an adversary context.Iss By implioffender for the crime of rape. In answering the cation, due process also required' the appellate
question posed, Justice Stewart's theory required
court to consider the pre-sentence report in its
the same kind of balancing process as Justice assessment of the "entire record." This analysis fit
White's analysis.
well with Justice Stewart's constitutional theory of
punishment.
Gardnerand ConstitutionalProcedures For Imposing
Justice White had one major disagreement with
Death
Justice Stevens' analysis. White believed that the
In Gardner,Justice Stewart joined justice Stevens'
procedures used to sentence Gardner to death vioplurality opinion invalidating the particular prolated the eighth amendment rather than the fourcedures used to impose the death penalty on the teenth amendment.S 6 Justice White reasoned that
defendant.' 8 ' Under the separate sentencing prothe use of secret information about the individual's
ceedings for the death penalty required by Florida character in imposing the death penalty would
law and upheld in Proffitt, the jury had advised the decrease the reliability of the death penalty decision-making required by Woodson. Using the Due
Process Clause as a basis for the Court's decision
1M8See 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
179Id.
implied for Justice White the possibility of apply'80
For example in concluding his Woodson opinion, ing the Court's standards for sentencing in death
Justice Stewart had stated:
penalty cases to other sentencing issues.'8 As inWhile the prevailing practice of individualizing sendicated by the analysis of his pre-Furman due proctencing determinations generally reflects simply eness cases, Justice White was generally reluctant to
lightened policy rather than a constitutional imperconcede that the Due Process Clause authorizes the
ative, we believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity, underlying the Eighth
Amendment,... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the particular offense as a consti82 Id. at 353 (plurality opinion by Justice Stevens).
tutionally indispensable part of the process of inflict83 Id. at 354.
Id.
at 361.
ing the penalty of death.
I'5
Id. at 359-60.
428 U.S. at 304. (plurality opinion by Justice Stewart)
(citations omitted).
'86430 U.S. at 364 (White, J., concurring).
18 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
1MId.
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Court to impose procedures on sentencing decisions.lss
Lockett and the Crime Unfit for Punishment

Just last term, in Lockett, Justice Stewart joined
the plurality opinion of Chief Justice Burger interpreting Gregg to invalidate the Ohio statute because
the mitigating circumstances were too narrowly
defined.Is 9 The Ohio statute authorizing the death
penalty for "aggravated murder"'"9 failed this test
because the trial judge was asked to consider only
three circumstances as mitigating factors in determining whether to impose death.' Justice Stewart
concurred in the Chief Justice's analysis that the
statutory standards of whether the victim induced
or facilitated the offense, whether the offense was
committed under duress, or whether the offense
was primarily the result of a psychosis, were too
narrow to permit proper "individualization" of the
decision to impose death.
Justice White, in his concurring and- dissenting
opinion, t 9 reasoned however that the statute was
unconstitutional on a ground ignored by the Chief
Justice, and by implication Justice Stewart. Justice
White interpreted the statute as authorizing the
death penalty without a finding that the defendant
had a "purpose" to cause the victim's death. 93
Petitioner Lockett was convicted of "aggravated
murder" on the basis of her participation in a
robbery-murder with three other persons. One of
her co-felons actually shot and killed the robbery
"a IfJustice White conceded that due process applied
to the Gardnercase, he would have been forced to address
the continued viability of Williams v. New York, 337
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victim. The homicide was alleged to be aggravated
because it had been committed for the purpose of
escaping detection for "aggravated robbery" and
during the course of aggravated robbery.'9
White pointed out that in Lockett's separate
trial, the judge had instructed the jury that if she
engaged in a "common design with others to rob
by force" she was presumed to have acquiesced in
the means chosen by her co-conspirators 95 In addition, her liability for the resulting death was
determined by the following standard:
If the conspired robbery and the manner of its
accomplishment would be reasonably likely to produce death, each plotter is equally guilty with the
principal offender as an aider or abettor in the
homicide.... An intent to kill by an aider andabettor may
be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt under such
circumstances.1

This definition of intent alone made the imposition
of death unconstitutional in Justice White's view.
He argued that without a finding of fact that
Lockett had a purpose to bring about death, the
state's imposition of the death penalty was unconstitutional. At best, in his opinion, Lockett was
convicted on the basis of "recklessness. ' 'Iuc
White went on to assert in his Lockett concurrence
that the society had made a judgment that the
"culpability" of those who act with the "purpose
to take life" is distinguishable from the individual
who acts without such purpose. Thus, if the death
penalty is imposed, the distinction can be ignored. ' 98 The clear implication in his theory in
Lockett is that imposing the death penalty as a

sanction put limitations on the adjudicative aspects
of the criminal law. Furthermore, Justice White's

U.S. 241 (1949), which had upheld the constitutionality
of non-disclosure of pre-sentence reports in a death pen- Lockett analysis raised questions about the applialty case under the fourteenth amendment Due Process
cability of the death penalty to the "felony murder
Clause. Justice Stevens distinguished Williams in his plurality opinion in Gardner, but his distinction relied on the doctrine," since Ohio's aggravated murder statute
assumption that particular procedures are prerequisite to is similar to the common law felony murder rule.
the constitutionality of a death penalty statute under the But this concern with the adjudicative aspect of
eighth and fourteenth amendments. 430 U.S. at 357-58 the process by which death is inflicted was previ(plurality opinion by Justice Stevens). Justice White
rejected that basic assumption in his concurring opinion ously noticeable in his opinions in Gregg and Roberts.t9
in Gregg and his dissenting opinion in Roberts.
The post-1976 death penalty cases thus demonBy insisting on a different doctrinal basis for his decision, Justice White's position indicated that the contin- strate two things about the two Justices' judicial
uing debates about "selective" incorporation of the Bill philosophy. First, viewing the death penalty from
of Rights is still a part of the Court's debates about the
criminal process.
'8 98 S. Ct. at 2965-67.
190The Ohio statute is reprinted in the appendix of the

Court's opinion. Id. at 2967.
191Id.

9 Id. at 2982 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
'9Id. at 2983.

2
9

Id. at 2957.
'9 Id. at 2984 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
'9 Id. (emphasis added).
97Id. at -, 98 S. Ct. at 2984-85.
98Id.

99 See text accompanying notes 48-61, supra.
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"proportionality" apart. The Court has yet to de3
cide upon the constitutionality of such a statute.2
But, since there is enough political pressure favoring the death penalty 2so and unrest in prison,0 at
some point the question is likely to come before the
Court. At that point, Justices White and Stewart
should define the issue in their own individual
terms-either punishment or responsibility-even
if they agree on the result in the case.
Another basis of disagreement may arise in the
context of defendant requests for the death penalty
to be imposed. At the time of this writing only
Gary Gilmore has been executed since the Court's
decision in Gregg in 1976. Gilmore's execution was
in many senses at "his request" and over the objection of institutional litigants.3 The attempts "to
save" Gilmore's life represents a more general problem that the Court may have to address: Under
what circumstances can an offender "waive" avenues available to avoid the death penalty and
"consent" to his execution? Justice White, in his
°
dissent to the vacating of a stay in Gilmore v."Utah 7
declared that a defendant cannot consent to an
III. SOME FUTURE ISSUES SURROUNDING THE DEATH unconstitutional imposition of the death penalty
PENALTY
under the eighth amendment.m Of course, this
In analyzing the Stewart and White approaches view is consonant with his general theory that the
to the death penalty, it is interesting to hypothesize state or the criminal process, but not the offender,
how the two Justices would respond to the appli- must determine whether the offender deserves the
cation of the penalty to various other offenses and death penalty.
Interestingly, Justice Stewart joined the majority
issues. For instance, were the issue of the constituin
vacating the stay in Gilmore. The per curiam
tionality of the death penalty for armed robbery
considered evidence of Gilmore's indijudgment
before the Court, we should expect a basic agreeto waive his right to appeal. A
capacity
vidual
as
to
the
and
White
Stewart
Justices
between
ment
method of reasoning and the resuit because of their finding that Gilmore had this individual capacity
agreement about proportionality in Coker. But such was thought by the majority to be the compelling
a rather simple application of Coker is unlikely since reason needed for allowing the execution.209Justice
even state appellate courts have declared the death Stewart's analysis of the requirement of "indivipenalty for armed robbery unconstitutional in dualization" in the death penalty's administration
authorizes the thus allowed him to view individual waiver as a
those few states where the legislature
2 1
0
robbery.
sufficient moral justification for imposing the death
armed
for
penalty
death
On the other hand, there do exist other issues penalty.
that may come before the Court that would likely
m Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637 n.5 (1977)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
rekindle the basic Stewart-White disagreement.
2' See N.Y. Times, April 7, 1978, § 2, at 3, col. 2.
For example, the constitutionality of a statute au(where the New York gubernatorial candidate indicates
thorizing a mandatory death penalty for a prisoner
that his opponent's opposition to the death penalty was
serving a life term who kills a prison guard while a major issue in the recent campaign).
s N.Y. Times, July 23, 1978, at 1,col. 1 (reporting a
trying to escape,= should drive their alliance on
prison disturbance in Illinois in which three prison guards
2
oo See text accompanying notes 168-80 supra.
were killed).
3
" The Georgia Supreme Court vacated the death
See generally Bedau, The Right to Die by Firing
penalty for armed robbery in Gregg even though the Squad-The Death Penalty and Gaiy Gilmore, 7 Hastings
Georgia statute permitted the death penalty for armed Center Rep. 5 (1977).
207429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
robbery. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1902 (1972 Supp.). See
m Id at 1018 (White, J., dissenting).
Gregg v. State, 233 Ga. 117, 210 S.E.2d 659 (1974).
"oId.at 1013.
" See R. I. GEN. LAw § 11-23-2 (1977 Supp.)'
either Justice Stewart's punishment perspective or
Justice White's responsibility perspective leads to
the same type of analysis when the question is the
"disproportionality" of the death penalty to a particular crime. The proportionality analysis necessarily requires an analysis that connects the legislative judgment about what is crime and what
sanction should be authorized for a proven
crime." Both Justice Stewart's and Justice White's
analysis permits the Court to embark upon this
judicial "second guessing" of legislative policy
judgment about the death penalty.
Second, Justice White's eighth amendment analysis of the death penalty may have implications for
problems not presently viewed as problems in sentencing. As he stated in his concurrence in Lockett,
the constitution has minimal standards for criminal
liability that must be met before the death penalty
can be imposed. There is a constitutional doctrine
of mens rea that must be met before the state is
justified in using the death penalty under the
Constitution.
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As the Gilmore circumstances indicate, the legal

the Supreme Court, we can anticipate some basic
disagreement between Justices Stewart and White
in the way they would approach the issues. A
sentencing issue for drug offenses should rekindle
the fundamental debate between Stewart and
White about the role of the "rehabilitative ideal"
anything on this issue even though the companion in criminal law illustrated by the previous analysis
case to Lockett, Bell v. Ohio,21 1 had lurking the of Robinson. Resolution of issues such21
as7 these should
question concerning the effect of mental capacity feel the effect of these two theories.
on the impositon of the death penalty. The defendJuvenile sentencing is another problem of senant in Bell was a 16-year-old boy who had been tencing that will also feel the influence of the two
transferred from juvenile to adult criminal court competing theories, even if it never reaches the
court for trial for aggravated murder.2 12 One ques- Court. At the heart of the debate over juvenile
tion arising from Bell, not resolved by the Court's sentencing is the question of the viability of the
decisions, is wheter extreme youth in and of itself juvenile process of adjudication as a means of
constitutes incapacity, short of insanity, so as to determining the need for social control of an indimitigate the death penalty. 213 Even though the vidual. 218 If policy makers view this problem solely
Court's handling of Lockett made it unnecessary to from Justice Stewart's perspective, they might try
address this issue, it is likely to reappear. 214 If the to insure that the procedures provide for sufficient
issue does reappear, we should expect Justices "individualization" at the dispositional phase of
White and Stewart to respond in terms of their the process. 219 If, on the other hand, the policy
respective theories of responsibility and punish- makers adopt Justice White's perspective, they
ment.
would be concerned with whether the processes of
A final point for distinguishing Justices White adjudication are capable of establishing the youth's
and Stewart could arise from the application of culpability in a manner that wouldjustify the new
their two constitutional theories to emerging issues harsher penalty.220 Asking either question about
of sentencing. So far the Court has managed to juvenile sentencing illustrates that legislators have
avoid entering the general debate about the inad- not yet considered these approaches in their recent
equacy of our prevailing sentencing practices and attempts
to reform juvenile sentencing proce22
policies."25 Lower courts, however, have begun to dures. '
struggle with the implications of the Court's death
Deciding any sentencing issue requires all of us
penalty doctrine outside of the death penalty con- to think systematically about a range of interretext. For instance, whether a mandatory life sen- lated problems and to utilize both Justices' theotence for certain drug offenders complies with the ries. For instance, sentencing reform may require
consideration of the extent to which "plea bargainCoker proportionality analysis has been addressed
and answered in the affirmative by state and fed- ing" is permissible and the degree of "discretion"
eral appellate courts.2 16 Were such a case before that a prosecutor should be given.2 Formulating
0
2 See generally Liebman & Shepart, Guiding Sentencing and asking questions of this nature as we debate
Discretion Beyond the "Boiler Plate" Mental Disorder as a sentencing reform should force us to consider the
Mitigating Factor, 66 GEo. L.J. 757 (1978).
criminal law as a process with component parts
2198 S. Ct. 2977 (1978).
that ought, in a normative sense, function together
212 State v. Bell, 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 358 N.E.2d 556
in
a certain matter. If a court decides that due
(1976).
213 "
process has or has not been violated in sentencing,
214 Public concern about "violent" youthful offenders
we should now be aware that the court has emis beginning to influence sentencing policy recommen- barked upon a process of telling us how the crimicapacity of the offender might become the subject
of future death penalty litigation. Almost all death
penalty statutes list the defendant's "mental capacity" in some form as a mitigating factor."0
However, the Court has thus far avoided deciding

dations. See, Zimring, PursuingJuvenileJustice:Comments on
Some Recent Reform Proposals, 55 U. Dar. J. UB.L.631,
637-40 (1978).
21 In Lockett, Chief Justice Burger pointed the inapplicability of his analysis to the problem of mandatory
sentencing. He emphasized "that in dealing with standards for imposition of the death sentence we intimate
no view regarding the authority of a State or of the
Congress to fix mandatory, minimum sentences for noncapital crimes." 98 S.Ct. at 2965 n.13.
16People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 371, N.Y.S.2d
471, 332 N.E. 2d 338, cert. denied 423 U.S. 950 (1975);

Ward v. Carmona, 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978).
7
21See discussion in Part I of text supra.
8

21 See Hazard, The Jurisprudenceof Juvenile Deviance, in
PURSUING
JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 1976).
9
2 Id. at 13-14.

m0 Id. at 14.
221 See Zimring, note 214 supra.
24 See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357

(1978) (Court upheld the prosecutors right to re-indict
the defendant as a habitual offender after his refusal to
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nal process functions as a system.22 This type bf
systematic analysis ought to influence the thinking
of legislators who are currently trying to reform
to problems of subsentencing without reference
4
stantive criminal law. 2
CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to articulate more
fully than the Justices themselves the fundamental
differences between Justices Stewart and White.
Their conflicting positions in particular death penalty cases are logical outgrowths of their primary
disagreement over the reach of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments. Yet, when considering the
proportionality of punishment to offense in a case
considered only under the eighth amendment, like
Coker, the two Justices are able to agree without
acmpt a plea bargain.)
'"See note 9 supra.
24See note 215 supra.

repudiating their basic theories. Only when Justice
Stewart begins to frame the issue in terms of procedural due process-"individualization"-does
disagreement arise. For Justice White, once the
issues of proportionality and adequacy of legislative criteria are settled, the usual procedural safeguards in criminal cases are adequate. In his view,
the concept of appellate courts as central policy
making bodies, a central tenet of Stewart's theory,
is untenable.
Future death penalty litigation may reflect the
fundamental differences between the two Justices.
Even if the Court never formally enters the debate,
the perspectives of Justices Stewart and White are
useful in analyzing the issues raised by the reforms
of our present discretionary sentencing practices. It
is to be hoped that by clarifying the nature and
source of these competing theories, the past and
future development of the administration of the
death penalty will seem more rational.

